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Abstract 
 
 
Studying the impact of fertility on the extent of female labor force participation and the 
form that this participation takes is complicated by the fact that both fertility and 
participation are potentially endogenous household decisions, requiring simultaneous 
estimation.  Such estimation is further complicated by the need to find appropriate 
instruments for fertility.  Moreover, the timing of marriage (or the probability of being 
married at a certain age), which is an important determinant of both fertility and 
participation, may also be endogenous to those decisions.  In this paper, we estimate a 
structural model for labor force participation that distinguishes between different 
participation states (non-wage work, public wage work, private wage work, and 
unemployment) and that takes into account the endogeneity of the timing of marriage and 
fertility.  We find that, in urban Morocco, marriage per se is not a constraint on labor 
force participation, but that it is a constraint on engaging in paid employment in the 
private sector.  The presence of school-age children significantly reduces participation in 
all types of wage work.  Moreover, a woman's own education, as well as that of her 
father, significantly increase the probability of her participation in the public sector.  
With the dramatic slowdown in public sector hiring in recent years, these variables are 
also strong determinants of female unemployment.
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I.  Introduction 
Taking into account the simultaneity of the timing of marriage, the fertility, and participation 
decisions is one of the principal challenges in modeling female labor market behavior.  Delayed 
marriage, and declining fertility in the MENA region in general, and in Morocco, in particular, can 
potentially translate into significant increases in female participation in market work.  An accurate 
assessment of the impact of these demographic changes on labor market behavior requires the 
specification of structural models, that can disentangle the effect of fertilty and and the timing of 
marriage on participation,from the impact of particpation on these two sets of decisions.    
The economic literature on the female particpation in the labor force is quite extensive.  
(Killingsworth 1983, Heckman et MacCurdy 1986, Killingsworth and Heckman 1986, Blundell 1990 
and Browning 1992).  Studies focusing on the United States have shown that participation in paid 
work is strongly related to age at marriage and fertility.  In fact, fertility in the United States has 
declined considerably in the 1960s (National Center for Health Statistics 1991) in part due to the delay 
in marriage  (Rodgers and Thornton 1985, Espenshade 1985, Bianchi and Spain 1986) and, in part, 
due to the reduction in the number of births per woman (Heckman and Willis 1977).  
 Although many early studies of female labor supply simply introduced the number and age of 
children in the home as exogenous regressors in participation equations (Mincer 1962, Heckman 
1974, Heckman and MaCurdy 1980), the recent literature has insisted that these variables are 
potentially endogenous and can therefore result in biased estimates(Schultz 1978, Dooley 1982, 
Moffit 1984, Hotz and Miller 1988, Nakamura and Nakamura 1985, 1992).  Mroz (1987) tested the 
sensitivity of the parameters of the labor supply equation of married women with respect to a number 
of assumptions including the exogeneity of the fertility decision, as captured by number of childen in 
two age categories.  He could not reject the exogeneity of fertility in the case of hours of work.  Xie 
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(19970 conducted an exogeneity test for both the particpation and hours of work equations using the 
generalized residual method and rejected exogeneity in the particupatio decision, but could not reject it 
for hours of work.  
Some authors attempted to address the endogeneity of fertility in the participation decision by 
adopting an instrumental variable methodology, whereby auxiliary equations are estimated for number 
of children and predicted values are subsitituted for the original child (Nakamura and Nakamura 
1992).  The main challenge in doing this has been to identify instruments that influence the fertility 
decision without also affecting the particpation decision directly.  In searching for suitable instruments 
for fertility, researchers have looked for sources of unplanned births (like the presence of twins) 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980) and to the availability and cost of contraceptive technology 
(Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985).  Previous work on female participation and sector choice in the 
MENA region either assumes that the number of children a woman has is exogenous to her 
participation or sector choice decision (Assaad and El-Hamidi 2001, 2002, El Aynaoui 1997) or 
simply leaves that information out altogether (Tunali and Baslavent 2001; Tansel 1994, 1996, 1999; 
Dayioglu 1999), essentially estimating a reduced form model.   
The timing of marriage is almost always left out as a determinant of participation.  The usual 
practice in the female labor supply literature is to include marital status as a set of  exogenous dummy 
variables or to limit the estimation of the participation or labor supply function to married women.   
However the exogeneity of marital status can also be called into question since particiption in the 
workforce prior to marriage can allow women to delay marriage.  In a structural framework, the 
timing of marriage is also a crucial determinant of fertility, but may also be endogenous to that 
decision.   
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Finally there is the issue of how participation itself is modeled.  The recent literature on 
developing countries stresses the different forms of market work that women can engage in and how 
each of these forms can have different implications for women ability to combine market work and 
child care (Hill 1983, 1989, Tiefenthaler 1994, Assaad and El-Hamidi 2001).  In particular, self-
employment can allow women to generate income while simultaneously caring for their chidren.  
Even within wage employment, public sector employment often involves shorter hours than 
employment in the private sector and often provides child care services that make it more compatible 
with child rearing.   
Our paper attempts to address these various issues by estimiating a structural model that takes 
into account the endogeneity of fertility and the timing of marriage to the participation decision and by 
modeling participation as a polychotomous variable that distinguishes between different participation 
states.  Since there is little heterogeneity in the kinds of economic activities that rural women in 
Morocco engage in, we focus our attention on urban women between the ages of 15 and 54.  The rest 
of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the methodolgy used in the econometric 
estimation,  section 3 discusses the sources of data and the characteristics of the sample we use, 
section 4 presents our results, and section 5 concludes.     
2. Methodology 
The procedure we adopt in our empirical work consists of three stages.  The first stage consists 
of estimating an equation for the age at first marriage using a parametric duration model that takes into 
account that the dependent variable is censored for the unmarried women in our sample.  We use this 
model to predict the age at first marriage for use in modeling fertility and the probability of marriage 
for use in modeling participation.  The second stage consists of estimating the determinants of the 
number of children born alive and the number of children under seven years of age for married 
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women using a count data model.  We use these estimates to predict the number of children under 
seven and the number of children seven and over, as the difference between the predicted total number 
of children and the predicted number of children under seven.  The final stage consists of estimating a 
nested logit model of participation for all women that accounts for the endogeneity of marital status 
and the number of children under seven and seven and over.1   
The main challenge in this estimating procedure is to find appropriate instruments for the 
endogenous regressors.  In the case of the timing of marriage, we use information from the mortality 
module of the survey on the total number of married sisters a women has.  This variable is unlikely to 
directly affect either the fertility or participation decisions, but is likely to affect the timing of marriage 
on the theory that parents with many daughters will prefer to marry them off early.  In the case of 
fertility, we obtain estimates of average contraceptive use by age at the provincial level from the 
Moroccan Demographic Health Survey of 1992.  These can as indicators of the availablity of family 
planning services in the vicinity of where the woman lives, and are, therefore, appropriate instruments 
for fertility.  
First Stage: Estimation of the Timing and Probability of Marriage 
The objective here is to predict the median age at first marriage for a woman of given 
characteristics for use as a regressor in the models for number of children and the probability of 
marriage for use as a determinant of the participation decision.  In estimating the age at first marriage, 
we use a parametric duration model to account for the fact that the dependent variable is right 
censored for the unmarried women in the sample.   Because the hazard of marrying is likely to first 
increase sharply after age 15, the legal age of marriage in Morocco, and then decrease gradually with 
                                                 
1
 In a subsequent draft, we intend to address the problem of the downward bias of reported standard errors when predicted 
regressors are present by bootstrapping all three stages of the model and reporting the bootstrap standard errors.  
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age after the mid twenties, we adopt a generalized Gamma distribution, which allows for such a shape 
(See Figure 1).   
Besides the number of married sisters a woman has, other explanatory variables for the age at 
first marriage include age cohort (in 5-year age categories), the woman’s education level, the 
education and work status of the parents, and region of residence.  The woman’s own education 
variable had to be carefully specified so that it would not be affected by the timing of marriage.  We 
have therefore specified educational attainment into three categories: no schooling (the reference 
category), some primary (six or fewer years of schooling) and primary and above (more than 6 years 
of schooling).  The decision to continue schooling beyond six years, which is usually done around age 
12, is not likely to be affected by when a woman is to be married.    
H
az
ar
d 
of
 
M
ar
ria
ge
Age
analysis time
10 20 30 40
0
.05
.1
.15
 
• Figure 1 : Hazard Function for the Timing of Marriage using a Generalized 
Gamma Distribution  
 Analysis time in our model is a woman's age, with the earliest observed entry time being 7, the 
earliest age at marriage in the sample.  The median age at first marriage is calculated as the time, t, at 
which the survival function, S(t), is equal to 0.5.  The predicted probability of marriage is equal to 1-
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S(t), where t is a woman's actual age.  The survival function under the Gamma parametrization is 
given by:   
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where 2−= κγ , { } σλκ /)ln()( jjtsignz −= , )exp( zu κγ= , )(zΦ is the standard normal 
cumulative distribution function, and ( )baI ,  is the incomplete gamma function. κ   is the Gamma 
parametrization shape parameter and σ is the scale parameter.  The model is implemented by 
parametrizing βλ jx=j  and treating κ  and σ  as ancillary parameters to be estimated from the 
data.2 
Second Stage:  The Fertility Decision 
Because the age of the children present in the household matters for the participation decision, 
we carry out estimates of both the total number of children born alive as well as the number of 
children under seven years of age for all ever married women in the sample.3  In both cases we use the 
prediced age at first marriage, obtained from the first stage, as a regressor.  
To account for the fact that the number of children is not a normally distributed continuous 
variables, it is preferrable to use a count data model rather than OLS.  We opt for a negative binomial 
model, which is a count data distribution, which allows for greater variation than a true Poission 
distribution.  In the case of number of children under seven, the relevant statistical tests show that the 
negative binomial model reduces to a Poisson model, which we use to maximize efficiency. 
                                                 
2
 See STATA reference manual, Volume 3, p. 353. 
3
 The large effect that the presence of pre-school children has on participation has been noted by Nakamura and Nakamura 
(1992) and Xie (1997) 
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As mentioned above the instrumental variables used in this set of regressions are based on 
age-specific contraceptive use in the province of residence, which is an indicator of access to family 
planning methdods and general awareness of these methods.  For each of the 32   provinces 
represented in the sample, we use data from the 1992 Moroccan Demographic Health Survey to 
calculate mean use rates for different age cohorts of women for modern and traditional contraception 
methods.  We thus produce a set of 14 instrumental variables (7 age groups by two types of methods).  
Other explanatory variables include the woman’s age and age squared, her level of education, the 
presence of other adult women in the household, her parents’ education, and region.  The model for 
children under seven has an identical specification. 
An additional set of instruments that could be used is the presence of unplanned births, as 
indicated by having twins in the first pregnancy (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980).  In our case, the 
number of women having twins proved to be very small and the rank of the twins in the order of births 
was other than the first pregancy in over half the cases.  Moreover, introducing this variable would 
limit the sample to women who have had at least one pregnancy,  which would eliminate many 
married women in our sample.  
We use the estimates from the two fertility regressions to predict the number of children born 
alive and the number of children under seven for both married and unmarried women.  The predicted 
number of children who are seven and older is calculated as the difference between these two 
predictions.     
Before we can introduce the predicted number of children in the two age groups into the third 
stage of our analysis – the participation stage --  we need to deal with the fact that our fertility 
estimates are conditional on being married, and marriage is endogenously determined in our model.  
We obtain estimate of the number of children that  are unconditional on marriage by multiplying the 
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predicted probability of marriage obtained in the first stage with the predicted number of children in 
the two age groups obtained in the second stage.   
Third Stage:  The Participation Decision 
As discussed above, the forms of participation in economic activity in the Moroccan context 
differ considerably in their implication for combining household responsibilities, and especially child 
rearing, with market work.  Accordingly we distinguish between five possible participation states, 
namely domestic work only (non-participation), non-wage market work (which includes self-
employment and unpaid family labor), public wage work, private wage work, and unemployment.  
Although the multinomial logit specification is often used for such a polychotomous dependent 
variable, this specification suffers from the need to make the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) assumption.  This assumption results from the maintained assumption that the disturbances 
associated with the utility derived from each option are independent and homoscedastic.  One way to 
relax the IIA assumption is to group the orginal alternatives into subgroups and allow the variances to 
differ across the groups while maintaning the IIA assumption within the groups.  This defines the 
nested logit model.4  
As shown in Figure 2, suppose that the particpation decision can be subdivided into a three-
level choice problem.  The first level consists of the decision of whether or not to engage in any kind 
of market work.  The second level is a choice between wage and non-wage work for those who decide 
to participate in market work and leaves the non-participants as they are.  The third level distinguishes 
between public and private work and unemployment, for those who select wage work, leaving the 
                                                 
4
 For more details on the nested logit model Greene (2000, pp. 865-871).   
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other branches unchanged. 5  Under the nested logit model, the IIA assumption is maintained within 
the alternatives of each decision, but can be relaxed across decisions.  
    
  1st level        2nd level      3rd level3     
 
 Inactive      Inactive     Inactivee    
 
 Active               Non wage earner    . Non wage earnere 
 
 
      Wage earner    SPrivate sectoré 
          
          Public sectoré 
          
                                                                                                 CUnemploymente  
• Figure 2: Decision Tree for the Nestd Logit Participation Model 
Suppose that each alternative at the third level is associated with a level of utility given by: 
iijijkiijijkijk ZYXU εεεγαβ +++′+′+′=      (1) 
where Zj ,Yij , and Xijk ,and are vectors of explanatory variables specific to the first, second and third 
level choices, respectively and εi , εij , εijk are independent and identically distributed error terms with 
Weibull distribution.6  The probability that an individual will choose alternative ijk in the third stage is 
given by:  
( ) )()()( iPijPijkPijkP =        (2) 
                                                 
5
 We assume that the unemployed, are either wage and salary workers who lost their jobs or young new entrants to the 
workforce who are primarily seeking wage employment.  This allows us to specify unemployment as an option within the 
wage branch. Those seeking to set up their own enterprises are  not likely to be a significant fraction of the unemployed in 
Morocco.  
6
 In our case, all the explanatory variables refer to the individual’s or her household’s characteristics rather than to the 
alternatives she selects, so that the same explanatory variables show up at all three stages.  Since each potential alternative is 
specified as a separate observation in the nested logit model, it was necessary to re-specify all the explanatory variables as 
interactions between the original explanatory variables and the relevant alternatives at each level, thus leading to different 
vectors of explanatory variables at each level.  
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where the conditional probability ( )ijkP will depend only on the parameter vector β ′ . 
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By substituting equations (3), (4) and (5) into equation (2), we obtain an expression of how the 
probability of each level-3 alternative depends on the explanatory variables and the model parameters.  
The nested logit model can be estimated by full information maximum likelihood estimation, where 
the log-likelihood function is given by: 
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)(lnln   where g indexes individuals in the sample. 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our main source of data from this study is the Moroccan Living Standards Measurement 
Study (LSMS), which was carried out in 1990-91.  The overall sample for this household survey 
consists of 3,323 households, containing 19,577 individuals.  Our working sample consists of all 
urban never married women aged 15 to 54 (1,076 individuals) and a subsample of urban ever married 
females aged 15-54  to whom the fertility module of the survey was administered (1,237 individuals).  
The fertility module was administered to only one randomly selected ever-married woman in each 
household.   
As shown in Table 1, mean age of marriage for the ever married women was 18.5 , with wage 
workers in the private and public sectors having a higher than average age at marriage and non-
participants and non-wage workers having lower than average age at marriage.  On average, these 
ever-married women have 3.8 children, with public and private wage workers, as well as the 
unemployed having fewer children than average. The pattern for children less than seven is less clear, 
with non-wage workers having fewer of them than wage workers but no-participants having more of 
them.  These patterns could well indicate an association between employment status, on the one hand, 
and the timing of marriage and fertility, on the other hand, or they could simply be due to the fact that 
differences in educational and other characteristics among women in different employment states 
accont for their differences in age at marriage and in fertility.  It will be up to the multivariate analysis 
to show us how fertility and timing of marriage affect employment choices. 
Comparing the never-married and the ever-married subsamples, the statistics shown in Table 1 
show that the never-married women are much younger than the ever-married women. The distribution 
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by age group reveals that 44 percent of the never-married women are below the age of 20, compared 
to only 1.6 percent of the ever-married ones.  Never-married women are also more educated, and have 
more educated parents.   
Never married women are somewhat more likely to be active than ever-married women, with 
an overall activity rate of 29 percent compared to 21 percent.  However, they are also much four times 
as likely to be unemployed, with a 12 percent of them being unemployed compared to 3 percent for 
ever-married women.  Never married women who are employed however, are much more likely to be 
private sector wage workers, whereas employed ever-married women are more likely to be non-wage 
or public sector workers.  These results suggest that public sector work and non-wage work may be 
much more accommodating to the domestic and child rearing responsabilities that come with marriage 
than is private sector employment.  Again, these preliminary observations will need to be confirmed in 
the multivariate analysis. 
Comparing the characteristics of women in different employment states within the never-
married subsample, we find that among wage workers in the public and private sectors are older, 
suggesting an association between these work states and a delay in marriage.  There is a sharp contrast 
in education, however, among never-married women working for wages in the private and public 
sectors.  Never married female wage workers in the private sector are significantly less educated than 
average, whereas their counterparts in the public sector are significantly more educated.   A similar 
pattern holds true for the education of their fathers.  Private wage workers are also much more likely 
to have an inactive father than never-married women in any other employment state.
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics for the Variables Used in the Analysis, Urban Moroccan Women, Ages 15-54, 1991 
 
Never Married 
 
Ever Married 
 Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unem-
ployed All  Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unemp-
loyed All 
Endogenous Variables:              
age at marriage n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
18.262 17.351 19.078 21.148 18.429 18.458 
        
(3.354) (2.892) (4.233) (4.466) (3.852) (3.568) 
total number of children n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
4.064 3.922 2.688 2.239 2.429 3.808 
        
(2.784) (3.090) (1.983) (1.794) (3.128) (2.779) 
number of children under 7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
0.888 0.558 0.719 0.648 0.571 0.833 
        
(0.974) (0.925) (0.917) (0.774) (0.815) (0.956) 
Number of Maaried Sisters:              
number of married sisters 0.823 0.592 0.950 1.313 0.908 0.849 
 
2.109 1.987 2.375 2.023 1.400 2.089 
 
(1.314) (0.788) (1.329) (1.991) (1.235) (1.314) 
 
(1.672) (2.593) (2.059) (1.794) (1.439) (1.770) 
number of married sisters missing 0.058 0.082 0.188 0.094 0.108 0.078 
 
0.013 0.039 0.031 0.057 0.086 0.021 
 
(0.233) (0.277) (0.393) (0.296) (0.311) (0.268) 
 
(0.115) (0.195) (0.175) (0.233) (0.284) (0.144) 
Age and Age Categories:              
Age 20.9 23.3 24.2 30.1 23.9 21.9 
 
36.8 39.2 37.4 37.3 34.0 36.9 
 
(5.7) (7.7) (7.4) (5.5) (4.7) (6.2) 
 
(9.6) (9.1) (7.8) (7.2) (10.5) (9.3) 
Age Squared 466.9 603.4 642.3 937.3 591.2 518.6 
 
1442.9 1617.8 1455.2 1445.4 1263.7 1449.5 
 
(298.3) (446.9) (410.8) (344.6) (251.6) (329.1) 
 
(714.0) (692.8) (610.5) (558.6) (764.4) (700.2) 
Age 15-19* 0.521 0.388 0.347 0.000 0.162 0.440 
 
0.017 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.057 0.016 
 
(0.500) (0.487) (0.476) (0.000) (0.368) (0.496) 
 
(0.131) (0.113) (0.000) (0.000) (0.232) (0.126) 
Age 20-24 0.275 0.306 0.198 0.188 0.423 0.284 
 
0.098 0.052 0.016 0.011 0.114 0.085 
 
(0.447) (0.466) (0.400) (0.397) (0.496) (0.451) 
 
(0.297) (0.223) (0.125) (0.107) (0.323) (0.279) 
Age 25-29 0.128 0.122 0.208 0.281 0.323 0.164 
 
0.151 0.117 0.141 0.114 0.257 0.149 
 
(0.335) (0.331) (0.408) (0.457) (0.469) (0.370) 
 
(0.358) (0.323) (0.350) (0.319) (0.443) (0.356) 
Age 30-34 0.043 0.061 0.158 0.313 0.077 0.067 
 
0.174 0.130 0.219 0.295 0.200 0.183 
 
(0.203) (0.242) (0.367) (0.471) (0.268) (0.250) 
 
(0.379) (0.338) (0.417) (0.459) (0.406) (0.387) 
Age 35-39 0.021 0.082 0.069 0.156 0.008 0.031 
 
0.170 0.156 0.297 0.216 0.057 0.175 
 
(0.143) (0.277) (0.255) (0.369) (0.088) (0.172) 
 
(0.375) (0.365) (0.460) (0.414) (0.236) (0.380) 
Age 40-44 0.007 0.020 0.010 0.063 0.000 0.008 
 
0.138 0.195 0.141 0.182 0.086 0.143 
 
(0.081) (0.143) (0.100) (0.246) (0.000) (0.091) 
 
(0.345) (0.399) (0.350) (0.388) (0.284) (0.350) 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics (Contn'd) 
 
Never Married 
 
Ever Married 
 Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unem-
ployed All  Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unemp-
loyed All 
Age 45-49 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.003 
 
0.122 0.208 0.063 0.114 0.114 0.124 
 
(0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.053) 
 
(0.328) (0.408) (0.244) (0.319) (0.323) (0.329) 
Age 50-54 0.003 0.020 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.004 
 
0.131 0.130 0.125 0.068 0.114 0.125 
 
(0.051) (0.143) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) 
 
(0.337) (0.338) (0.333) (0.254) (0.323) (0.331) 
Own Schooling:              
no schooling* 0.195 0.184 0.465 0.094 0.108 0.206 
 
0.695 0.779 0.578 0.125 0.486 0.648 
 
(0.396) (0.387) (0.499) (0.291) (0.310) (0.405) 
 
(0.461) (0.415) (0.494) (0.331) (0.500) (0.478) 
incomplete primary 0.178 0.490 0.257 0.031 0.162 0.193 
 
0.170 0.143 0.078 0.057 0.314 0.159 
 
(0.383) (0.505) (0.439) (0.177) (0.369) (0.395) 
 
(0.375) (0.352) (0.270) (0.233) (0.471) (0.366) 
complete primary 0.315 0.204 0.089 0.188 0.231 0.275 
 
0.086 0.026 0.031 0.159 0.000 0.082 
 
(0.465) (0.407) (0.286) (0.397) (0.423) (0.447) 
 
(0.281) (0.160) (0.175) (0.368) (0.000) (0.275) 
lower secondary 0.229 0.061 0.099 0.250 0.200 0.206 
 
0.032 0.026 0.109 0.205 0.057 0.049 
 
(0.421) (0.242) (0.300) (0.440) (0.402) (0.405) 
 
(0.176) (0.160) (0.315) (0.406) (0.236) (0.215) 
vocational secondary 0.016 0.041 0.069 0.156 0.115 0.038 
 
0.009 0.000 0.063 0.216 0.057 0.027 
 
(0.124) (0.200) (0.255) (0.369) (0.321) (0.192) 
 
(0.096) (0.000) (0.244) (0.414) (0.236) (0.164) 
upper secondary 0.056 0.020 0.020 0.094 0.131 0.061 
 
0.003 0.013 0.031 0.114 0.057 0.015 
 
(0.231) (0.143) (0.140) (0.296) (0.338) (0.240) 
 
(0.055) (0.114) (0.175) (0.319) (0.236) (0.120) 
university 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.054 0.020 
 
0.005 0.013 0.109 0.125 0.029 0.020 
 
(0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.397) (0.227) (0.138) 
 
(0.072) (0.114) (0.315) (0.333) (0.169) (0.141) 
Parental Schooling:              
father, illiterate or incomp. primary* 0.527 0.653 0.782 0.375 0.485 0.547 
 
0.783 0.831 0.766 0.602 0.571 0.766 
 
(0.499) (0.476) (0.413) (0.484) (0.500) (0.498) 
 
(0.412) (0.375) (0.424) (0.489) (0.495) (0.423) 
father, complete  primary 0.321 0.286 0.168 0.563 0.415 0.323 
 
0.191 0.156 0.125 0.307 0.400 0.200 
 
(0.467) (0.456) (0.376) (0.504) (0.495) (0.468) 
 
(0.393) (0.365) (0.333) (0.464) (0.497) (0.400) 
father, secondary or above 0.152 0.061 0.050 0.063 0.100 0.129 
 
0.026 0.013 0.109 0.091 0.029 0.034 
 
(0.359) (0.242) (0.218) (0.246) (0.301) (0.336) 
 
(0.158) (0.114) (0.315) (0.289) (0.169) (0.181) 
mother, illiterate or incomp, primary* 0.822 0.878 0.931 0.938 0.831 0.839 
 
0.980 0.974 0.922 0.943 0.971 0.974 
 
(0.383) (0.328) (0.254) (0.242) (0.375) (0.367) 
 
(0.138) (0.159) (0.268) (0.231) (0.167) (0.159) 
mother, complete primary 0.115 0.102 0.040 0.031 0.138 0.108 
 
0.014 0.013 0.031 0.034 0.000 0.016 
 
(0.319) (0.306) (0.196) (0.177) (0.347) (0.310) 
 
(0.119) (0.114) (0.175) (0.183) (0.000) (0.126) 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics (Contn'd) 
 
Never Married 
 
Ever Married 
 Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unem-
ployed All  Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unemp-
loyed All 
mother, secondary or above 0.063 0.020 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.053 
 
0.005 0.013 0.047 0.023 0.029 0.010 
 
(0.243) (0.143) (0.171) (0.177) (0.173) (0.224) 
 
(0.072) (0.114) (0.213) (0.150) (0.169) (0.098) 
Parental Activity Status:              
father, active 0.827 0.898 0.931 0.719 0.777 0.831 
 
0.989 0.961 1.000 0.943 0.943 0.983 
 
(0.378) (0.306) (0.255) (0.457) (0.418) (0.375) 
 
(0.106) (0.195) (0.000) (0.233) (0.236) (0.129) 
mother, active 0.139 0.265 0.178 0.094 0.138 0.147 
 
0.111 0.195 0.188 0.080 0.143 0.119 
 
(0.346) (0.446) (0.385) (0.296) (0.347) (0.354) 
 
(0.314) (0.399) (0.393) (0.272) (0.355) (0.324) 
Household Characteristics:              
presence of inactive males 0.559 0.408 0.356 0.594 0.469 0.523 
 
0.398 0.260 0.172 0.239 0.314 0.364 
 
(0.813) (0.840) (0.687) (0.798) (0.864) (0.811) 
 
(0.731) (0.616) (0.521) (0.479) (0.932) (0.708) 
presence of male wage workers 0.429 0.469 0.436 0.250 0.300 0.411 
 
0.365 0.416 0.203 0.125 0.200 0.338 
 
(0.750) (0.767) (0.767) (0.568) (0.643) (0.736) 
 
(0.644) (0.695) (0.596) (0.396) (0.473) (0.630) 
presence of male non-wage workers 0.359 0.327 0.267 0.156 0.231 0.327 
 
0.342 0.234 0.281 0.136 0.286 0.316 
 
(0.696) (0.555) (0.527) (0.574) (0.536) (0.656) 
 
(0.629) (0.535) (0.487) (0.345) (0.572) (0.602) 
presence of other adult females 0.988 0.939 0.970 0.906 0.962 0.979 
 
0.576 0.714 0.500 0.568 0.543 0.579 
 
(0.108) (0.242) (0.171) (0.296) (0.193) (0.145) 
 
(0.495) (0.455) (0.504) (0.498) (0.505) (0.494) 
Modern contraceptive use in province:              
by women 15-19 0.308 0.286 0.337 0.276 0.268 0.304 
 
0.300 0.267 0.367 0.281 0.277 0.299 
 
(0.217) (0.243) (0.298) (0.220) (0.198) (0.225) 
 
(0.213) (0.218) (0.298) (0.261) (0.191) (0.222) 
by women 20-24 0.340 0.373 0.393 0.395 0.338 0.348 
 
0.340 0.341 0.384 0.369 0.327 0.344 
 
(0.133) (0.201) (0.143) (0.224) (0.111) (0.140) 
 
(0.141) (0.192) (0.146) (0.161) (0.135) (0.147) 
by women 25-29 0.419 0.431 0.427 0.433 0.420 0.421 
 
0.418 0.427 0.414 0.428 0.404 0.418 
 
(0.121) (0.110) (0.121) (0.118) (0.132) (0.121) 
 
(0.117) (0.113) (0.136) (0.132) (0.121) (0.119) 
by women 30-34 0.430 0.414 0.441 0.370 0.434 0.429 
 
0.420 0.398 0.419 0.442 0.408 0.420 
 
(0.135) (0.170) (0.157) (0.174) (0.128) (0.140) 
 
(0.138) (0.170) (0.161) (0.166) (0.137) (0.143) 
by women 35-39 0.467 0.470 0.436 0.456 0.446 0.462 
 
0.475 0.463 0.442 0.454 0.429 0.470 
 
(0.135) (0.108) (0.120) (0.133) (0.128) (0.132) 
 
(0.148) (0.147) (0.139) (0.135) (0.115) (0.146) 
by women 40-44 0.406 0.410 0.384 0.433 0.423 0.407 
 
0.412 0.448 0.383 0.388 0.424 0.411 
 
(0.148) (0.199) (0.172) (0.167) (0.174) (0.157) 
 
(0.167) (0.201) (0.190) (0.190) (0.218) (0.174) 
by women 45-49 0.263 0.269 0.275 0.272 0.289 0.268 
 
0.246 0.250 0.247 0.268 0.277 0.249 
 
(0.148) (0.177) (0.162) (0.153) (0.152) (0.151) 
 
(0.157) (0.196) (0.177) (0.153) (0.203) (0.162) 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics (Contn'd) 
 Never Married  Ever Married 
 Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unem-
ployed All  Inactive 
Non-
Wage 
Workers 
Private 
Wage 
Workers 
Public 
Wage 
Worker 
Unemp-
loyed All 
Traditional contraceptive use in province:              
by women 15-19 0.004 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.003 0.004  0.003 0.001 0.005 0.015 0.010 0.004 
 (0.034) (0.002) (0.065) (0.000) (0.029) (0.036)  (0.030) (0.003) (0.042) (0.070) (0.056) (0.035) 
by women 20-24 0.043 0.034 0.044 0.052 0.043 0.043  0.041 0.034 0.031 0.041 0.036 0.040 
 (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.050) (0.045) (0.047)  (0.046) (0.052) (0.042) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) 
by women 25-29 0.042 0.031 0.040 0.051 0.044 0.042  0.039 0.028 0.026 0.047 0.030 0.038 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.058) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048)  (0.045) (0.040) (0.044) (0.062) (0.040) (0.046) 
by women 30-34 0.063 0.060 0.071 0.051 0.069 0.064  0.064 0.064 0.067 0.079 0.056 0.065 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.039) (0.057) (0.054)  (0.059) (0.050) (0.056) (0.058) (0.042) (0.058) 
by women 35-39 0.081 0.066 0.098 0.076 0.081 0.082  0.081 0.077 0.073 0.096 0.073 0.081 
 (0.066) (0.072) (0.082) (0.080) (0.070) (0.069)  (0.067) (0.067) (0.075) (0.083) (0.066) (0.069) 
by women 40-44 0.064 0.067 0.099 0.095 0.074 0.069  0.060 0.057 0.071 0.109 0.064 0.064 
 (0.087) (0.091) (0.107) (0.098) (0.090) (0.090)  (0.085) (0.080) (0.082) (0.117) (0.081) (0.088) 
by women 45-49 0.067 0.073 0.095 0.049 0.062 0.069  0.064 0.057 0.081 0.090 0.052 0.066 
 (0.077) (0.085) (0.077) (0.064) (0.067) (0.077)  (0.078) (0.071) (0.083) (0.077) (0.059) (0.078) 
Region:              
South 0.110 0.122 0.129 0.219 0.085 0.112  0.132 0.169 0.250 0.080 0.200 0.138 
 (0.313) (0.331) (0.337) (0.420) (0.279) (0.316)  (0.338) (0.377) (0.436) (0.272) (0.406) (0.345) 
Tensift 0.149 0.204 0.198 0.313 0.223 0.170  0.131 0.182 0.156 0.205 0.171 0.141 
 (0.357) (0.407) (0.400) (0.471) (0.418) (0.376)  (0.337) (0.388) (0.366) (0.406) (0.382) (0.349) 
Center* 0.101 0.143 0.218 0.094 0.115 0.115  0.117 0.182 0.188 0.102 0.257 0.128 
 (0.301) (0.350) (0.413) (0.291) (0.319) (0.319)  (0.322) (0.386) (0.390) (0.303) (0.437) (0.334) 
North-West 0.154 0.163 0.218 0.125 0.215 0.167  0.140 0.169 0.109 0.284 0.171 0.151 
 (0.362) (0.373) (0.415) (0.336) (0.413) (0.373)  (0.347) (0.377) (0.315) (0.454) (0.382) (0.358) 
Center-North 0.134 0.122 0.178 0.094 0.108 0.133  0.148 0.169 0.188 0.159 0.143 0.152 
 (0.340) (0.331) (0.385) (0.296) (0.311) (0.340)  (0.355) (0.377) (0.393) (0.368) (0.355) (0.359) 
East 0.198 0.102 0.020 0.125 0.154 0.169  0.171 0.026 0.016 0.057 0.029 0.141 
 (0.398) (0.306) (0.140) (0.336) (0.362) (0.375)  (0.376) (0.160) (0.125) (0.233) (0.169) (0.349) 
Center-South 0.154 0.143 0.040 0.031 0.100 0.133  0.162 0.104 0.094 0.114 0.029 0.148 
  (0.362) (0.354) (0.196) (0.177) (0.301) (0.340)   (0.369) (0.307) (0.294) (0.319) (0.169) (0.355) 
Number of Observations 764 49 101 32 130 1076   973 77 64 88 35 1237 
Standard Deviations are in parentheses. 
* denotes reference category,   n.a. = "not applicable" 
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Turning to the ever-married women subsample, we note that unemployed women are 
the youngest among them, and non-wage workers the oldest.  Although public sector wage 
workers are still the most educated among them, the least educated are non-wage workers, 
followed by non-participants.  Again, similar patterns holds for father’s education.  Mother’s 
education is invariably very low among ever-married women, with private and public wage 
workers having the most educated mothers.   
4. Estimation Results  
In what follows, we present estimation results in the order laid out in the methodology 
section above.  We start with the determinants of the timing of marriage, moving onto the 
determinants of fertility ending with the nested logit participation model.   
First Stage:  Estimation of the Age at First Marriage  
As indicated above, we estimate a parametric duration model for the age at first marriage 
using a Gamma parametrization (see Table 3).  The first thing to note is that the instrument we 
selected for the timing of marriage, namely the number of married sisters is highly significant 
and has the expected negative sign.  Because parents with many daughters will typically want 
to marry them off quickly, women with more married sisters tend to marry earlier.  The 
marginal effect indicates that each additional married sister reduces the age at marriage by 
about 0.6 years for the reference woman.7  We marked the few cases that had missing 
information on married sisters with an indicator variable.  The fact that this variable is positive 
and significant suggests that women with few or no married sisters were more likely to report 
the number of married sisters as missing. 
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Table 2:  Determinants of Age at First Marriage.   
Estimates from a Parametric Duration Model of Age at First 
Marriage (Generalized Gamma Distribution), Urban Moroccan 
Females 15-54,1991 
Age at first marriage Variables 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Number of married sisters -0.022 -0.588 
 (0.004)*** (0.098)*** 
Number of married sisters 0.059 1.617 
missing (0.029)** (0.656)** 
Age (15-19 is the reference)  
 
Age 20-24 -0.019 
-0.495 
 (0.023) (0.477) 
Age 25-29 -0.034 
-0.885 
 (0.022) (0.470)* 
Age 30-34 -0.080 
-2.026 
 (0.023)*** (0.489)*** 
Age 35-39 -0.136 
-3.364 
 (0.024)*** (0.507)*** 
Age 40-44 -0.176 
-4.278 
 (0.027)*** (0.552)*** 
Age 45-49 -0.240 
-5.649 
 (0.027)*** (0.553)*** 
Age 50-54 -0.239 
-5.626 
 (0.028)*** (0.578)*** 
Own education level  
(illiterate is the reference) 
 
 
Some Primary 0.019 0.518 
 (0.017) (0.354) 
Completed primary and above 0.152 4.359 
 (0.014)*** (0.358)*** 
Parent's Education Level 
(Iliiterate and incomplete 
primary is the reference) 
 
 
Father primary 0.042 1.142 
 (0.013)*** (0.294)*** 
Father lower secondary and 
above 
0.050 1.352 
 (0.030)* (0.653)** 
Mother primary 0.091 2.516 
 (0.031)*** (0.722)*** 
Mother lower secondary and 
above 
-0.022 
-0.568 
 (0.045) (0.930) 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 The reference woman is one for whom all dummy variables take on a value of 1 and whose continuous variables 
are set at the sample mean.  For purposes of this regression, the reference woman is a 15 to 19 year old illieterate 
woman who has no married sisters and whose parents have not completed their primary education and are not 
economically active. She lives in the Greater Casa Blanca region. 
 20 
Parents’ Activity  
 
Father active -0.195 
-4.69 
 (0.027)*** (0.595)*** 
Mother active 0.022 0.578 
 (0.017) (0.369) 
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Table 2:  Determinants of Age at First Marriage (Contn'd) 
Variables Age at first marriage 
Coefficients Marginal effects 
Regions 
(Casa Blanca is the reference) 
 
 
Souss Massa – Draâ 0.011 0.298 
 (0.029) (0.607) 
Guelmime - Es Semara -0.048 
-1.239 
 (0.031) (0.652)* 
Marrakesh - Tensift – Al Haouz -0.032 
-0.836 
 (0.026) (0.552) 
Doukkala – Abda 0.004 0.093 
 (0.031) (0.657) 
Tadla – Azilal -0.099 
-2.497 
 (0.060)* (1.170)** 
Chaouia - Ouardigha -0.101 
-2.552 
 (0.036)*** (0.725)*** 
Tanger – Tetouan -0.056 
-1.440 
 (0.034)* (0.695)** 
Gharb – Chrarda – Bni Hsen -0.041 
-1.074 
 (0.034) (0.694) 
Rabat – Sale 0.020 0.534 
 (0.029) (0.618) 
Taza – Alhouceima - Taounate 0.017 0.461 
 (0.038) (0.820) 
Fez – Boulemane -0.005 
-0.125 
 (0.026) (0.552) 
L’Oriental -0.004 
-0.100 
 (0.025) (0.523) 
Meknes – Tafilalet -0.001 
-0.033 
 (0.026) (0.538) 
Constant/Predicted Median Prob. 3.223 26.50 
 (0.045)*** 
kappa 
 
-1.028 
(Generalized Gamma shape param.) 
parameter) 
(0.084)*** 
Sigma 
 
0.235 
(Generalized Gamma scale param.) (0.006)*** 
Number of observations 2,313 
Log-likelihood without regressors -840.81 
Log-likelihood of full model -426.18 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Marginal effects are computed for a reference individual for whom the continuous variables 
are set at the sample mean and the dummy variables are set to zero.  The effects for dummy 
variables are for discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
* Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 1% level. 
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The fact that the coefficients of the age cohort dummies are all negative indicates that, 
as expected, age at marriage has increased steadily over the years in Morocco.  As shown in 
Figure 2, women with reference characteristics above age 45 have the lowest predicted age at 
marriage of about 21 and the predicted age at marriage increases steadily as age declines to 
reach about 26 years for the youngest women in the sample. 
As expected, a woman’s own education significantly raises the age at marriage.  A 
woman with reference characteristics have has had some primary education marry 0.52 years 
later than one with no education, and one who completed more than six years of schooling 
marries 4.4 years later.  Parental education also tends to raise women’s age of marriage, as 
educated parents are more likely to be aware of the problems associated with marrying their 
daughters early.  A reference woman with a father who has some primary education marries 
1.1 years later than one who’s father is illiterate, and one whose father has some secondary 
education or more marries 1.4 years later.  Mother’s education has an even larger effect.  A 
reference woman whose mother has some primary education marries 2.5 years later than one 
whose mother is illiterate.  The fact there is no significant effect for mothers with higher levels 
of education can probably be attributed to the very small fraction of mothers with more than 
primary education. 
It is hard to know a priori what direction of effect to expect on a father’s activity 
status.  It turns out that active fathers marry their daughters much sooner than inactive fathers.  
Since paternal activity is probably related to the age of the father, this is probably an indication 
of the difference in age between father and daughter.  Holding the woman’s age constant, an 
inactive father probably indicates an older father and therefore a larger age difference.  Fathers 
who have daughters later in life are probably less likely to marry them off early.  Maternal 
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activity has the expected positive effect on age at marriage.  Mothers who work are more 
likely to want to keep their daughters at home with them to help with household chores. 
We decided to specify the regions of Morocco in this regression at a greater level of 
detail to capture possible cultural and ethnic differences in attitudes about early marriage.  
With the Casa Blanca region as the reference category, we note a somewhat lower age at 
marriage in the Southern region of Guelmime–Es Semara, in the Center-South region of 
Tadla-Azilal, in the Central region of Chaouia–Ouardigha, and in the Northern region of 
Tanger–Tetouan.  Age at marriage for urban women in other regions of the country is not 
significantly different from Casa Blanca, when other variables are controlled for.   
Second Stage: The Fertility Equation 
In this stage of the analysis we estimate the number of children born alive and the number of 
children under seven years of age present in the household for urban ever-married women 
between the ages of 15 and 54.  As shown in Table 3, the predicted median age at first 
marriage obtained from the first stage, has the expected negative effect on fertility.  For the 
reference woman, a delay in marrying of one year significantly reduces the reference woman’s 
fertility by 0.04 children.  The effect on number of children under seven is not significant.   
At least some of the age-specific rates of contraceptive use at the province level by 
type of contraception appear to be significant determinants of fertility, indicating that they are 
appropriate instruments.  For the modern methods of contraception, three of the age-specific 
utilization rates are significant determinants of the total number of children born alive, and two 
of the three have the expected negative sign.  Only the utilization rate for women 45-49 is a 
significant determinant of the number of children under age seven.  For the traditional  
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Table 3: Determinants of the Number of Children.   
Parameter Estimates from a Negative Binomial Regression Model for the total 
Number of Children Born Alive and a Poisson Regression Model for the 
Number of Children under age 6, Moroccan Ever- Married Women in Urban 
Areas, Ages 15-54, 1991  
Total number of children Number of children under 7 Variables 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Predicted age at first -0.051 -0.039 -0.031 -0.022 
 (0.014)**
* 
(0.014)*
** 
(0.024) (0.018) 
Age (15-19 is the 
reference) 
 
 
 
 
Age 20-24 0.595 0.623 0.497 0.454 
 (0.265)** (0.232)*
** 
(0.296)* (0.236)* 
Age 25-29 0.961 1.235 0.704 0.721 
 (0.257)**
* 
(0.247)
*** 
(0.289)** (0.246)**
* Age 30-34 1.301 2.048 0.639 0.631 
 
(0.256)*
** 
(0.302)*
** 
(0.292)** (0.248)** 
Age 35-39 1.439 2.464 0.301 0.248 
 
(0.259)*
** 
(0.362
)*** 
(0.302) (0.231) 
Age 40-44 1.450 2.499 -0.494 -0.275 
 
(0.262)*
** 
(0.393)
*** 
(0.322) (0.209) 
Age 45-49 1.548 2.836 -1.317 -0.517 
 
(0.266)*
** 
(0.472)
*** 
(0.361)*** (0.209)** 
Age 50-54 1.557 2.867 -2.417 -0.643 
 
(0.266)*
** 
(0.469)
*** 
(0.434)*** (0.213)*
** Own education level 
(Illiterate woman is the 
reference) 
 
 
 
 
Incomplete Primary -0.002 
-0.001 -0.077 -0.052 
 (0.052) (0.040) (0.094) (0.066) 
Primary, completed -0.089 
-0.065 -0.106 -0.071 
 (0.081) (0.061) (0.148) (0.098) 
Lower Secondary -0.261 
-0.176 -0.214 -0.136 
 (0.109)** (0.080)
** 
(0.185) (0.116) 
Technical -0.351 
-0.227 -0.187 -0.121 
 (0.137)** (0.097)
** 
(0.212) (0.132) 
Upper Secondary  -0.518 
-0.310 -0.316 -0.192 
 (0.213)** (0.128)
** 
(0.295) (0.165) 
University -0.668 
-0.373 -0.100 -0.068 
 (0.187)** (0.124)
*** 
(0.232) (0.151) 
  
 
 
 
Presence of adult women 0.209 0.178 -0.144 -0.094 
aged  15-64 in the household (0.037)** (0.056)
*** 
(0.069)** (0.053)* 
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Table 3: Determinants of  Number of Children (Contn'd) 
Variables Total number of children Number of children under 7 
 Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Parents’ Education Level  
(Illiterate and incomplete 
primary is the reference) 
 
 
 
 
Father primary -0.050 
-0.037 0.013 0.000 
 (0.046) (0.035) (0.084) (0.060) 
Father lower secondary and 
above 
-0.248 
-0.168 -0.223 -0.141 
 (0.137)* (0.093)* (0.231) (0.137) 
Mother primary 0.119 0.097 0.142 0.108 
 (0.157) (0.138) (0.265) (0.218) 
Mother lower secondary and 
above 
-0.131 
-0.094 0.084 0.062 
 (0.287) (0.194) (0.419) (0.322) 
Average use of modern 
contraceptive methods in 
Province by age group: 
 
 
 
 
Age 15-19 -0.141 
-0.108 -0.237 -0.167 
 (0.143) (0.112) (0.274) (0.195) 
Age 20-24 -0.303 
-0.232 0.120 0.085 
 (0.394) (0.308) (0.742) (0.524) 
Age 25-29 -0.835 
-0.640 -1.273 -0.899 
 (0.453)* (0.389)* (0.887) (0.689) 
Age 30-34 0.629 0.482 0.625 0.442 
 (0.364)* (0.310) (0.691) (0.509) 
Age 35-39 0.039 0.030 0.282 0.199 
 (0.299) (0.229) (0.583) (0.414) 
Age 40-44 -0.165 
-0.126 0.338 0.239 
 (0.204) (0.159) (0.362) (0.267) 
Age 45-49 -0.808 
-0.619 -1.098 -0.775 
 (0.349)** (0.330)* (0.650)* (0.551) 
Average use of traditional 
contraceptive methods in 
province by age group: 
 
 
 
 
Age 15-19 -2.697 
-2.066 -1.252 -0.884 
 (1.547)* (1.300) (3.038) (2.163) 
Age 20-24 -2.583 
-1.978 -1.307 -0.923 
 (1.175)** (1.050)* (2.204) (1.602) 
Age 25-29 -2.036 
-1.559 -0.000 0.000 
 (1.193)* (0.946)* (2.199) (1.553) 
Age 30-34 -2.237 
-1.713 -1.021 -0.721 
 (0.818)*** (0.752)** (1.563) (1.114) 
Age 35-39 1.633 1.250 1.021 0.721 
 (1.086) (0.868) (2.019) (1.420) 
Age 40-44 1.844 1.413 0.026 0.018 
 (0.891)** (0.778)* (1.667) (1.177) 
Age 45-49 0.496 0.380 0.363 0.256 
 (0.480) (0.383) (0.946) (0.675) 
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Table 3:  Determinants of the Number of Children (Contn'd) 
Variables Total number of children Number of children under 7 
 Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Coefficients Marginal 
effects 
Regions: 
(Center is the reference) 
 
 
 
 
South -0.138 
-0.098 -0.168 -0.109 
 (0.129) (0.096) (0.233) (0.151) 
Tensift 0.236 0.204 0.161 0.123 
 (0.142)* (0.143) (0.281) (0.229) 
North-West -0.048 
-0.036 0.023 0.017 
 (0.162) (0.120) (0.304) (0.220) 
Centre-North 0.028 0.021 0.168 0.129 
 (0.117) (0.091) (0.210) (0.169) 
East 0.330 0.299 0.267 0.216 
 (0.116)*** (0.133)** (0.213) (0.187) 
Center-South -0.194 
-0.135 -0.252 -0.157 
 (0.141) (0.101) (0.274) (0.163) 
  
- 
 
 
Constant/Pred. # of children 1.428 0.766 0.678 0.706 
 (0.424)*** 
 
(0.670)  
Alpha 0.069    
(Negative binomial regression 
ancillary parameter) 
(0.014)***    
Number of observations 1,237 1,237 
Log-likelihood without 
regressors  
-2,901.68 -1,522.07 
Log-likelihood of full model -2,600.51 -1,264.23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Marginal effects are computed for a reference individual for whom the continuous variables are set at the 
sample mean and the dummy variables are set to zero.  The effects for dummy variables are for discrete 
change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
* Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 10% level. 
** Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant coefficient or effect at the 1% level. 
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methods, five of the age-specific utilization rates have a significant effect on the total number 
of children born alive, with four out of the five, having the expected sign.  None of the 
traditional methods utilization rates have an effect on the number of children under seven.  
To further test the performance of our instruments, we conducted a Wald test of the 
joint significance of all the coefficients of the age-specific rates of modern contraceptive use 
and found them to be jointly significant in both models.  A similar test for the traditional 
methods also proved significant.  Finally, we replaced the age-specific rates with a single rate 
of modern contraceptive use and one of traditional contraceptive use and found both to be 
negative and significant determinant of fertility in both models.   As expected, the number of 
children born alive increases steadily with age, with all the age group dummies being positive, 
significant, and progressively larger.  As shown in Figure 2, the predicted number of children 
born alive for the reference woman increases from 0.77 children at age 15 to 19 to 3.23 
children for women aged 35-39, stabilizes, and then increases again for women 45 to 49 and 
Figure 2
Predicted Median Age At Marriage, Predicted Number of Children Born Alive, Predicted Number of 
Children Under Six by Age Cohort, Urban Moroccan Women 15-54, 1991
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50 to 54.  The predicted number of children under 6 increases from 0.71 at age 15-19 to reach 
a peak of 1.43 at age 25-29, and then declines steadily to about 0 at age 50 to 54. 
The education variable is specified in a little more detail in this model than in the age 
of marriage regression, with dummy variables indicating levels of educational attainment from 
incomplete primary to university.  Illiterate is still the reference category.  In the regression for 
the total number of children born alive, all the education coefficients are negative and 
increasing in magnitude, indicating an inverse relationship between education and fertility.  
For the regression of children under seven, the coefficients are all negative as well, but there is 
a weaker association between the number of children in this age group and the education level, 
because the younger women who are likely to have such children are also likely to be more 
educated.  The marginal effects indicate that increasing the level of education for the reference 
woman from illiterate to lower secondary reduces the total number of children she is expected 
to have from 0.77 to 0.59 children, a reduction of 23 percent.  A further increase in education 
and increasing it all the way to university reduces it to 0.39 children or 49 percent. 
Once a woman’s own education is taken into account, parental education seems to 
have a weak and insignificant effect on a woman’s fertility.  The presence of other adult 
women in the household appears to significantly increase the total number of children born 
alive, but to reduce the number of children under seven.  The first effect can be interpreted to 
be the result of the reduced burden of child care when other care providers are available.  It is 
not clear why the presence of alternative care givers would reduce the number of children 
under seven. 
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Compared to Casa Blanca, the reference region, urban areas in the regions of Tensift 
and the East have higher fertility rates.  Fertility in the urban areas of other regions seems to be 
no different from that of Casa Blanca. 
Third Stage: The Participation Decision 
In this stage of the analysis we estimate a structural nested logit model of participation 
with the probability of marriage, the expected number of children under seven and the 
expected number of children 6 and over as endogenous regressors.  As indicated in the 
methodology section, the expected number-of-children variables are specified here as 
unconditional on marriage by multiplying the predicted number of children conditional on 
having married by the probability of having married.  The estimation results are shown in 
Table 4.  The reference state is inactive in the first level, non-wage worker in the second level, 
and private wage worker in the third level.  The interpretation of the coefficient estimates is 
therefore how the relevant variable affects log odds of being active vs. inactive in the first 
level, being a wage worker versus a non-wage worker in the second level, conditional on 
having chosen to be active in the first level, and being a public wage worker or being 
unemployment versus a private wage worker in the third level, conditional on having chosen 
wage work in the second level.  
The predicted probability of marriage appears on its own and interacted with the number of 
children conditional on being married.  The interpretation of the coefficients associated with 
this variable is therefore the effect of being married and not having children, a situation in 
which few women find themselves in Morocco.  Being married with no children, has no 
significant effect on the choice to be active nor the choice to be a wage worker.  It has a large 
positive effect on being employed for wages in the public sector.  In other words, has a 
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negative effect of being employed for wages in the private sector once the wage work path has 
been chosen.  This is not surprising given that a woman’s domestic responsibility increase 
significantly with marriage, making it incompatible with the usually long hours of work 
required in private sector wage work. 
Surprisingly the predicted number of children under the age of seven has an 
insignificant impact on the probability of being active, on the probability of being a wage 
worker once active, and on the probability of being unemployed or a public sector worker, 
once a wage worker.   In fact, the expected negative effect of having young children on private 
wage work seems to have been already captured by the probability of marriage variable.  
Having children who are seven years of age and older has a negative effect on the 
probability of being a wage worker, once active, confirming that non-wage work is more 
compatible with child care than wage work.  It has insignificant effects on the choice of being 
active and an insignificant effect on the type pf wage work one engages in. 
The preceding reveal that wage work in the private and public sectors have extremely 
different implications for married and unmarried women.  The public sector appears to be 
much more hospitable to married women.  It seems fairly easy to continue working in the 
public sector after marriage, whereas most private sector workers quit their jobs after 
marrying.  Although Moroccan law in theory provides for paid and unpaid maternity leaves in 
all sectors, these are often only respected in the public sector.   Mothers in that sector can also 
benefit from child care services and can generally work significantly shorter hours than in the 
private sector.  In contrast, it appears to be very difficult to be a mother in the private sector.     
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Table 5:  Parameter Estimates from a Three-Level Nested Logit Model of Participation in 
the Labor Force, Urban Moroccan Women, 15-54, 1991  
 1st level 2nd level 3rd level 
 Active vs 
Inactive 
Wage work 
vs. Non-
wage Work 
Public wage 
work vs. 
Private 
Wage Work 
Unemploym
ent vs. 
Private 
Wage Work 
Predicted probability 2.705 1.074 7.790 -1.740 
of marriage (1.851) (1.363) (1.970)*** (1.496) 
Predicted number of children  -1.095 -0.060 -0.576 0.569 
under 7 unconditional on marriage (0.822) (0.641) (0.959) (0.780) 
Predicted number of children 7  0.362 -0.811 0.045 -0.217 
and older unconditional on marriage (0.441) (0.179)** (0.286) (0.308) 
     
Age -0.178 -0.019 -0.440 -0.046 
 (0.057)*** (0.044) (0.064)*** (0.050) 
Age square 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001) 
 
Own education level 
(Illiterate is the reference) 
 
    
Incomplete Primary 0.448 -0.358 0.613 0.628 
 (0.346) (0.324) (0.560) (0.365)* 
Primary, completed -1.262 0.030 3.589 1.323 
 (0.847) (0.727) (0.585)*** (0.466)*** 
Lower Secondary  -2.094 1.074 3.391 0.768 
 (1.481) (0.740) (0.572)*** (0.447)* 
Technical -0.957 1.311 3.637 1.058 
 (1.834) (0.897) (0.646)*** (0.536)** 
Upper Secondary -1.372 0.462 4.483 2.054 
 (1.686) (1.129) (0.818)*** (0.674)*** 
University 0.989 1.139 3.691 0.593 
 (2.159) (1.141) (0.750)*** (0.687) 
Parents' education level 
(Illiterate and incomplete primary are 
the reference) 
    
Father primary -0.181 -0.353 0.925 1.039 
 (0.350) (0.368) (0.347)*** (0.303)*** 
Father lower Secondary and above -1.055 0.205 -0.194 -0.146 
 (0.920) (0.623) (0.574) (0.503) 
Mother primary 0.822 -0.638 -0.668 0.349 
 (0.745) (0.514) (0.765) (0.541) 
Mother lower Secondary and above 0.994 -0.748 -0.852 -0.706 
 (1.475) (0.909) (0.841) (0.730) 
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Household characteristics 
(Household with no adult male or 
female present is the reference) 
 
    
Presence of inactive male -0.328 -0.016 0.045 0.226 
 (0.231) (0.188) (0.233) (0.182) 
Presence of adult male 0.040 -0.182 -0.450 -0.213 
wage worker (0.203) (0.166) (0.287) (0.195) 
Presence of adult male -0.320 -0.104 -0.455 0.035 
non-wage worker (0.239) (0.191) (0.328) (0.224) 
 0.186 0.569 -0.376 -0.099 
Presence of adult woman (0.471) (0.299)* (0.395) (0.394) 
Regions:  
(Center is the reference) 
    
South -0.456 0.128 1.409 -0.218 
 (0.504) (0.379) (0.539)*** (0.417) 
Tensift -0.467 0.099 1.496 0.308 
 (0.455) (0.362) (0.495)*** (0.378) 
North-West -0.495 0.270 1.549 0.105 
 (0.502) (0.370) (0.530)*** (0.408) 
Centre-North -0.475 0.281 0.876 -0.513 
 (0.500) (0.371) (0.553) (0.432) 
East -1.987 -0.381 2.907 1.902 
 (0.723)*** (0.820) (0.843)*** (0.727)*** 
Centre-South -0.759 -0.578 1.672 0.491 
 (0.495) (0.479) (0.612)*** (0.508) 
     
Inclusive Value Parameters 1.716 0.595   
 (0.727)** (0.381)   
Number of observations : 11,565 
Number of individuals   : 2,313 
Log-likelihood of full model:  -1718.70 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant coefficient at the 10% level 
** Statistically significant coefficient at the 5% level 
*** Statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level 
 
We now move to the discussion of the remaining regressors on the participation 
decision.  The coefficients estimates are shown in Table 4.  Age and age squared have 
predictable pattern on the probability of being active and on the probability of wage work once 
active.  These probabilities first increase with age and then decline after a certain point.  The 
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negative coefficient of age and positive coefficient on age squared in the case of participation 
in the public sector (relative to the private sector) shows in no uncertain terms the effects of 
the dramatic slowdown in public sector hiring in Morocco in recent years and the resultant 
aging of the public sector work force.   
The probability of being active seems to have a U-shaped relationship with education, 
with the highest levels reached for illiterates and university graduates and lowest for the lower 
secondary level.  However, none of the education dummies are significant for this selection 
process.  Education does not seem to strongly influence the choice of engaging in wage work 
versus non-wage work either, once the decision to be active has been made.  In contrast, 
education has a very strong effect on the probability of joining the public sector relative to 
working for wages in the private sector, and on the probability of unemployment, also relative 
to wage work in the private sector.  The strong similarity in the effect of education on 
unemployment and public sector work suggests that unemployment in Morocco is strongly 
concentrated among the more educated youths who in the past would have been hired by the 
public sector but whose opportunities in that sector have been strongly curtailed by attempts to 
reduce the growth of that sector.  The private sector on the other hand seems to hire primarily 
less educated workers, providing few acceptable opportunities for the more educated.  The 
relative drop in unemployment at the university level indicates that those most affected by the 
slowdown in public sector hiring are workers with intermediate levels of education. 
Once a woman’s own education has been controlled for, the education of the father 
seems to have little effect on the decision to be active and that of being a wage worker.  
However, it significantly increases the probability of working in the public sector and of being 
unemployed, relative to working for wages in the private sector.  This confirms again that 
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women from relatively more privileged backgrounds tend to shun wage work in the private 
sector and have a strong preference for public sector work.  When they are unable to get such 
work, they remain unemployed.  The education of the mother does not have much of an effect 
on the participation decision.  
The presence of men in the household, irrespective of their employment status, tends 
to have no significant effect on the participation decision, once the other determinants have 
been controlled for.  The presence of adult women seems to increase the probability of wage 
work, but the effect is only significant at the 10 percent level.  This is in line with expectations, 
since other adult women can serve as alternative caregivers and can reduce the burden of 
domestic work, allowing a woman to work outside the home.  
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis has allowed us to elucidate the causal relationship between the timing of 
marriage and fertility on the one hand, and between these two factors and a woman’s 
participation decision in urban Morocco, while overcoming the methodological difficulties 
associated with the mutual interdependence of these decisions.  Through a judicious choice of 
instruments for the timing of marriage and fertility, we were able to estimate structural 
equations that provide estimates for the effect of fertility and marital status on the participation 
decision.  We were also able to specify participation as a set of distinct employment states, 
offering significantly different opportunities for women to reconcile between market work and 
their domestic responsibilities.   
Our findings indicate that marriage per se significantly reduces participation in private 
wage work, relative to public wage work.  We also find that participation as a whole and in 
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wage work relative to non-wage work is not strongly affected by marriage.  The results also 
suggest that the presence of children under seven does not have a sigficant effect beyond that 
of marriage.  Since the arrival of children is an anticipated event once a women gets married, 
its effect may already be included in the effect of marriage.  The larger the number of children 
6 and over a woman has, the less likely she is to participate in wage work.   
With regards to the other determinants of participation, our work confirms previous 
results that indicate a strong positive relationship between education and participation in 
public sector work and in the probability of being unemployed.  It suggests that the significant 
increase in unemployment among youth in Morocco in recent years is directly associated with 
the slowdown in public sector employment. Since the public sector hires primarily female 
workers with intermediate and higher levels of education, these are the workers that have the 
highest rates of unemployment.  It appears however that university educated workers 
experience less unemployment than those with secondary schooling. 
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